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THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW*

William W. Bishopf
contrast with the previous lectures in this series on the Rule
of Law, we are today not concerned with how the Rule of Law
operates in a highly organized modem state like our own United
States; but are turning instead to the world-wide community (or
perhaps more properly international arena or international sphere
of action, since the very word "community" may over-emphasize
the degree of common sentiment!), in which the present role of
the law is far less than within the state. Our first question is
whether there is in fact any such thing as an international Rule of
Law, or something approaching it. We may be like the legendary
essayist on "Snakes in Ireland," who simply wrote, "There are no
snakes in Ireland." Some would dismiss our topic by saying,
"There is no international rule of law." If I agreed with them, I
would sit down and we would all be spared anything further in
this lecture. But I do not believe that such would be an accurate
appraisal; such a quick denial of the international Rule of Law
would not correspond to reality of today.
Thus it becomes necessary to inquire in some detail how far
we do have anything which may properly be described as the
international Rule of Law, to speculate a bit why we do not have
more, and to ask what may be done to bring about a more effective
Rule of Law internationally.
What do we mean by "international Rule of Law"? Without
precise definition, I believe we could agree that the concept includes reliance on law as opposed to arbitrary power in international relations; the substitution of settlement by law for settlement
by force; and the realization that law can and should be used as
an instrumentality for the cooperative international furtherance
of social aims, in such fashion as to preserve and promote the values
of freedom and human dignity for individuals. Charles Rhyne,
former American Bar Association President, said:

I

N

"The rule of law within nations ... connotes the existence
of the hundreds of legal rules, the legal procedures, courts,
and other institutions which in sum total add up to order and
• Lecture delivered on June 27, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general
topic, "Post-War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special
Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor,
June 20-July I, 1960.-Ed.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.

554

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

stability, equality, liberty, and individual freedom. . . The
rule of law among nations means the regulation of mutual
intercourse of nations, and international contacts and relations
of individuals, by legal concepts, standards, institutions and
procedures. " 1
Before going further, let me clarify two points. In dealing
with the international Rule of Law, we are not discussing the normal application of international law by national courts in appropriate cases coming before those courts.2 Nor are we concerned
primarily with the disputes of individuals with other individuals
who are separated by national boundaries. Such disputes and relations are reasonably well handled by national courts and national
laws, in accordance with conflict of laws principles - although
greater unification of private law in some fields would be welcome,
and greater uniformity of conflict of laws rules desirable. For such
disputes between individuals there is also commercial arbitration,
powerfully encouraged by the Arbitration Association, International Chamber of Commerce, and similar groups.3
Our real problem arises when one or more governments become
parties to the controversies; when there is a dispute between an
individual (or corporation) and a foreign government, or between
the governments of two or more nations. It is to this situation that
we look this afternoon. In our consideration of this topic, let us
remember the strong support for the international Rule of Law
expressed by Executive, congressional, and judicial officers of our
own Government and of foreign democracies, and the interest of
various groups of practicing lawyers, represented particularly by
the American Bar Association's Special Committee on World
Peace Through Law. 4 President Eisenhower said two years ago,
l Opening statement before Boston Conference on World Peace Through Law, March
27, 1959. A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF I.Aw
AMONG NATIONS: DIGEST OF PROCEEDINGS OF REGIONAL CONFERENCES OF LAWYERS 47 (1959).
2 Cf. statement of Mr. Justice Gray, in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900):
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination." See also Dickinson, Changing Concepts and
the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1932); Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 and 792
(1952-53).
8 See DOMKE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION (1958).
4 See Rhyne, address as President of A.B.A., World Peace Through Law, 44 A.B.A.J.
937 (1958), also in 83 A.B.A. REP. 624 (1958); Rhyne, World Law or World Holocaust,
81 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 30 (1958); Report of Special Committee on International Law Planning (T. E. Dewey, Chairman), 83 A.B.A. REP. 566 (1958); and documentation of the
A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law. Note also the work of the
World Rule of Law Center at Duke Law School (Arthur Larson, Director}, and that Center's DESIGN FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL RULE OF I.Aw (1960).
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on "Law Day U.S.A.": "In a very real sense the world no longer
has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it
must choose the rule of law."5 In 1919 Woodrow Wilson ·wrote:
"What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the
governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." 0
Senator Robert Taft declared, Sept. 25, 1947: "I do not see how
we can hope to secure permanent peace in the world except by
establishing law between nations and equal justice under law."7
Referring to the ABA Special Committee on World Peace Through
Law as " 'practical idealism' at work," former Governor Adlai
Stevenson said, Oct. 21, 1959: "Building peace is the most important job in the world today. It cannot be built by arms. It can
only be built by law." 8 Pointing to the need to establish the rule
of law so as to "provide a way of settling disputes among nations
as it does among individuals," Vice-President Nixon declared,
April 13, 1959: "If we are to rule out, as we have and should, the
use of force or threats of force as a means of settling differences
where negotiations reach an impasse, the sole alternative is the
establishment of the rule of law in international affairs." 9
How far has the world gone in the adoption of an international
Rule of Law? What sort of law and courts do we now have in the
international sphere? How well do they work, and why don't they
do a better job? Here we are concerned with international law, that
system of customary rules and international agreements considered
by nations as legally binding on themselves in their dealings with
one another and with each other's citizens.
Our present system of international law grew up in the 16th
and 17th centuries among Western European states that had become sovereign, that is to say, independent of any temporal superior, and yet were in need of some means of regulating and making
more predictable their relations with each other. Widespread
theories of a natural law which obligated individuals and nations
alike, and a common background of Roman law and of Christianclassical ethical and intellectual traditions, made it easier for the
idea of an international law, binding on independent sovereign
states, to take root. Building upon what seems a curious hodge5 Statement of April !JO, 1958, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 831 (1958), quoted in A.B.A.,
Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, COMPILATION OF QUOTATIONS 4 Gan.
1960).
6 Quoted id. at 5.
7 Quoted id. at 11.
s Quoted id. at 12.
9 Quoted id. at 5.
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podge of recorded international practice, legal doctrines of Roman
law and canon law, ethical and philosophical speculations, and
whatever else came to mind, the law writers of 300 and 400 years
ago formulated principles and rules of international law. To a
greater or lesser extent their statements were accepted and acted
upon by nations in their practice, and then in turn succeeding
writers drew both upon the earlier ·writers and the resulting practice of states. Through this repeated interaction of jurist and practical statesman, the ideas and natural-law philosophy of some of
these "classical" writers on international law, like the I 7th-century
Grotius and 18th-century Vattel, had a tremendous influence upon
the development of international law. For the last century and a
half, however, it is to international customary law and international
agreements, to the positive law actually followed by nations, that
we turn, rather than to natural law speculations of the writers.
Today, in seeking the sources of international law10 we begin
with treaties, which lay down rules binding on the countries in
question. Internationally, treaties take the place of both contract
and statute in domestic law, since between the parties to a treaty
the provisions thereof supersede customary international law.
Secondly, we look to "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law." Here we have the foundation
of our international legal system, and meet the difficulties encountered when we look critically at any customary law. The practice
must be "general," and must be accepted as legally binding. But
it is hard to say how many nations must follow a practice before
it is "general," what difference it makes which nations these are
and whether there is conflicting practice or express opposition to
the alleged custom, whether it is necessary that the particular
nations in controversy are among those which can be shown to
have accepted the practice.
As a third source, international courts are directed to follow
also "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,"
although in practice much less reliance seems to have been placed
upon this source.
Finally, at least as "subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law," in international law we look to prior decisions of
international tribunals or of national courts dealing with international law, and to the "teachings of the most highly qualified
10 For

the sources of international law, see Statute of International Court of Justice,

art. 38, 59 Stat. 1060 (1945). The language quoted in the text is that of this article 38.
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publicists of the various nations." In so doing, we must bear in
mind that stare decisis is not a part of international law, and that
our ideas of precedent are not found in the legal systems followed
by the larger part of the world. Nevertheless, customary international law has largely developed from case to case, and an increasing number of these cases have been submitted to international
tribunals or have been decided by national courts. Decisions of
the courts help to form custom, and they show us what courts have
accepted as international law.11 As for the writers, we must remember Mr. Justice Gray's admonition, in The Paquete Habana,
[175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)] that, "Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what
the law really is."
What organs for its law work does the international community
possess? I would answer: a partially developed judicial system, a
considerable body of administrative machinery, and no organized
executive or legislative organs such as we find within the modern
state. Even casual study of its Charter shows how the United
Nations differs from what we think of as the executive or legislative branches of a government. Our international legislative
process is solely that of agreement upon treaties by all the nations
bound by them; we have no international legislature empowered
to enact by majority votes laws obligatory on those not taking part
in the legislative process.
Turning to institutions for the settlement of international disputes by application of law, what sort of courts do we find to deal
1\Tith controversies between nations, or between a nation and those
individuals or companies who are alien to that nation? Frequently
during the past 160 years nations have resorted to international
arbitral tribunals of their mm creation. They have formed ad hoc
tribunals to hear and decide either some single controversy or a
group of cases. The state itself is usually regarded as plaintiff or
defendant in such cases, although the real interest may be that of
individuals aggrieved by the conduct of those for whom the defendant state is responsible. Often these tribunals consist of one person
11 In Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815), Chief
Justice Marshall wrote for the Court, concerning international law: "The decisions of the
courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to every country,
will be received, not as authority, but with respect. The decisions of the courts of every
country show how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood in that country, and
will be considered in adopting the rule which is to prevail in this."
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named by each side and a neutral umpire; sometimes more arbitrators are used, and sometimes only a single judge. The exact
questions to be decided, and the procedure to be followed, must
be agreed upon by the states concerned. Decision, usually by majority vote, is through application of international law to the facts
found by the tribunal, although the parties may agree on special
rules to be followed. While within our country parties resort to
arbitration because they want to keep out of the courts, international arbitration has been regarded as judicial settlement by an
"ad hoc court," since nations have used this device in order to
obtain a decision by law when there was no suitable court for the
purpose or because they believed that the arbitral tribunal could
do the particular judicial job better than any other available international court. International arbitration has, therefore, generally
been treated as an international judicial procedure.
Since 1920 we have had the "World Court" at The Hague, first
established as the Permanent Court of International Justice,1 2 and
then in the 1945 creation of the United Nations transformed into
the International Court of Justice.13 This court consists of fifteen
judges (only one from any nation), elected for nine-year terms by
majority votes of the United Nations General Assembly and of the
Security Council. It is required that in the court "as a whole the
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal
legal systems of the world should be assured." Although the United
States did not join the court until 1945, there has always been an
American citizen among its judges.14
Only states (not individuals or corporations on the one hand,
nor international organizations on the other) can be parties in
cases before the court, although UN agencies and other international organizations may ask for advisory opinions. The "World
Court" has jurisdiction over disputes which both parties to the
controversy agree to lay before the court. This may be done by
special agreement after the dispute arises, or states may agree in
advance to give the court jurisdiction over particular types of disputes arising between them - usually those involving interpretaHUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JusnCE, 1920-1942 (1943).
13 For the treaty under which the court is established, see 59 Stat. 1055 ff. (1945). See
also ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusnCE (1957); LISSrIZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JusncE (1951); LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL CoURT (1958).
14 Americans who have served as judges of the "World Court" have been, successively,
John Bassett Moore, Charles E. Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, Manley 0. Hudson, and Green
H. Hackworth (the present incumbent). Philip C. Jessup takes office in 1961.
12 See
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tion and application of some treaty.15 Beyond this, those nations
who wish to do so may, in relation to others accepting the same
obligation, accept in advance the jurisdiction of the court as compulsory in all legal disputes concerning (a) the interpretation of
a treaty, (b) any question of international law, (c) the existence of
any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation, or (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.16
Thirty-nine nations are now subject, in varying degrees, under this
"optional clause" to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in
legal disputes as thus defined when the plaintiff state has also
accepted this jurisdiction.17 These include the United States,
United Kingdom, France, Nationalist China, India and Japan; but
the Soviet Union and all other Communist nations are conspicuously absent. Even this compulsory jurisdiction is in some instances cut down by the terms on which it is accepted. The United
States, for example, limits our acceptance by the self-judging proviso of the Connally Amendment, that acceptance does not apply
to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America," thus rendering our acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to a large extent illusory.18
Under the UN Charter, each member of the UN "undertakes
to comply with the decision" of the court in any case to which
15 For example, Art. 26 of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Italy, signed Feb. 2, 1948, provides: "Any dispute between
the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or the application of this Treaty,
which the High Contracting Parties shall not satisfactorily adjust by diplomacy, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties shall
agree to settlement by some other pacific means." 63 Stat. 2255, 2294.
10 This so-called "optional clause" is art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1060 (1945).
17 A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF LAw
AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 7 (1960).
18 Emphasis added. United States acceptance of Aug. 26, 1946, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL.
452 (1946), 61 Stat. 1218 (1946). At present such "self-judging" limitations qualify the
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and
Sudan, as well as the United States. See generally Briggs, Reservations to Acceptance of
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Hague Academy of International Law, 93 RECUEIL DES CoURS 223 (1958).
Because of the reciprocal features of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, if the
plaintiff state has qualified its acceptance of jurisdiction, the defendant state may take
advantage of this qualification even though its own acceptance of jurisdiction was given
unconditionally. Thus in the Case of Certain Nonvegian Loans, brought by France against
Nonvay when France's acceptance was limited by a provision similar to the Connally
Amendment, the Court decided that it was without jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
dispute. [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 8. (France has since withdrawn this limitation upon her
acceptance of jurisdiction.)
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it is a party; if a party "fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party
may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to give
effect to the judgment."19
Although the Perm.anent Court of International Justice had
rather more business between the two World Wars, since 1946 the
International Court of Justice has been markedly underworked.
It has given judgment on the merits in about a dozen cases and
rendered advisory opinions on about a dozen questions. Quite a
number of other cases have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Many international controversies which appear suitable for judicial
settlement have not been submitted to the court (often because
jurisdiction over the defendant state was obviously lacking),20
while UN organs have been slow to seek advisory opinions.
In addition to the International Court of Justice, we must not
lose sight of the effective Court of Justice of the European Communities, created for the European Coal and Steel Community and
broadened to serve also as the court for the European Economic
Community and Euratom.21 Although it is geographically and
functionally limited to the "Inner Six" European nations in the
Communities, this court is a real step forward toward the international rule of law. Nor should we forget the recently-established
19 United Nations Charter, art. 94, 59 Stat. 1051 (1945). See also Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1960).
20 "Other legal disputes which might have been submitted to the Court during the
period since 1946 include those relating to: the validity of Kashmir's accession to India;
India-Pakistan sharing of river waters; the right of prisoners of war in Korea to refuse
repatriation; the Peruvian seizure of the Onassis and other ships; the Egyptian claim of
the right to bar Israel from the use of the Suez Canal and passage through the Gulf of
Aqaba; the objections of Japan and others to U.S. nuclear bomb tests over the high seas;
French seizure of Algerian emissaries on airplane from Morocco; Egyptian nationalization
of the Suez Canal; Icelandic fishery laws; Indonesian seizures of Dutch property; the status
of Formosa and the off-shore islands; the question of West New Guinea; the Allies' right
of access to West Berlin; Tibet's right to independence from Communist China; and
hundreds of individual claims, accumulating in foreign offices throughout the world, of
denials of justice according to international law. The defendants in most of these disputes,
if they had been filed, would have been entitled to deny the jurisdiction of the Court on
the ground that they or the plaintiffs had not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court or that their acceptance or the plaintiffs' acceptances were subject to reciprocally
applicable reservations." A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE
RULE OF LAW AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 15 (1960).
21 Concerning this court, see VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL
AND STEEL COMMUNITY (1955); Stein, The European Coal and Steel Community: the Beginning of its Judicial Process, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 985 (1955); Stein, The Court of Justice
of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1954-1957, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 821 (1957);
STEIN &: NICHOLSON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET-A LEGAL
PROFILE, vol. I, ch. II, The New Institutions (by E. Stein) and ch. VII, New Legal Remedies of Enterprise (by E. Stein and P. Hay) (Michigan Legal Studies, 1960).
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European Court of Human Rights, 22 concerned with the problems
of individual human rights in the European countries accepting its
jurisdiction.
While international arbitration and decision by the "World
Court" are the two principal means for the use of law in the settlement of international disputes, we must not overlook the important part law may play in the settlement of disputes by direct negotiation, or in connection with mediation, conciliation, or adjustment
of controversies through political bodies such as the Security
Council, General Assembly, or Organization of American States.23
In focusing our attention as Ia-wyers upon the institutions applying law to the settlement of international disputes, we must not
forget that the most frequent use of law internationally lies in
action taken according to its rules rather than in litigation or the
settlement of controversies. The daily reliance upon international
law as a standard of conduct in the normal relations between nations far exceeds in frequency, and may well equal in importance,
its role as a basis for the settlement of disputes.
Why do states comply with international law, in so far as they
do? The sanctions of international law appear to be a mixture, in
proportions depending on the circumstances, of the forces of public
opinion, habit, good faith, expediency, self-help, and reciprocal
advantage when the law is followed and fear of retaliation if it is
broken. Within the modem state the rule of law is backed by readily available force, indeed by more or less a monopoly of force in
governmental hands, as well as by prevailing law-abiding sentiment. International law is usually quite well observed, in so far
as its demands on states are not very exacting. However, we need
means for compelling observance of the law internationally, which
do not result in violence and evils far greater than the violation.
But we must remember that the weaknesses of international law
to meet the needs of the present day lie deeper than any mere question of sanction. As Brierly so well pointed out:
"It is not the existence of a police force that makes a system
of law strong and respected, but the strength of the law that
makes it possible for a police force to be effectively organized.
22 See Robertson, The European Court of Human Rights, 9 A11r. J. CoMP. L. I (1960).
23 "These varied methods of facilitating agreement between parties to a dispute
provide opportunities for statesmanship. Their success depends on the skill with which
they are used by the statesmen concerned••••
"The capacity of either party to a dispute to demand arbitration or judicial settlement
as a last resort probably facilitates negotiation." A.B.A. Special Committee on ·world Peace
Through Law, THE RULE OF LAW AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 19 (1960).

562

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

The imperative character of law is felt so strongly within a
highly civilized state that national law has developed a machinery of enforcement which generally works smoothly,
though never so smoothly as to make breaches impossible. If
the imperative character of international law were equally
strongly felt, the institution of definite international sanctions
would easily follow." 24
With the world organized as it is, we must recognize that international law has not in the past been able to deal with the deliberate law-breaker; that nations have not been willing to act in such
fashion as to put power behind the law. We may ask whether the
imminent possibility of destruction of the greater part of the population and resources of the world by nuclear weapons and other
instruments of warfare, may force even reluctant statesmen to recognize the advantages of following the law when departure from
it may in serious matters bring such consequences.
Is there any obligation, either in law or in fact, to use law and
these international agencies? Article 33 of the United Nations
Charter does require that,
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice."215
In Article 2, paragraph 3, members of the United Nations agree
that "All Members shall settle their internationl disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered."26 But despite these general provisions, the weakest point in our present international legal system
lies in the fact that, except as parties may by treaty contract otherwise, the jurisdiction of international courts is purely voluntary;
an unwilling defendant violates no law in merely declining to have
the controversy dealt with by processes of the law. In the absence
of specific agreement conferring jurisdiction, there is no means
whereby a would-be plaintiff nation may bring another into court
without the latter's consent, or obtain a judgment by default if it
fails to appear. On this point President Eisenhower well said, "We
24 BRIERLY, THE

25 59 Stat. 1042
26 Id. at 1037.

LAw OF
(1945).

NATIONS

73 (4th ed. 1949).
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have . . . at least the structure and machinery of an international
rule of law which could displace the use of force. What we need
now is the universal will to accept peaceful settlement of disputes
in a framework of law."27
Herman Phleger, former Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, recently declared: "We have plenty of law and plenty of
mechanics for judicial determination of legal disputes, but there is
no general will on the part of governments to resort to the existing
law and the existing mechanics. The great problem is to change
the climate of public opinion."28 It is in this respect that the current movements for the world rule of law may hope to accomplish
the most, through bringing about the desire to use the international law and international judicial machinery we already have.
But this is not the sole answer. We must ask what types of
international disputes are susceptible to adjudication. There is
much truth in the assertion that whether an international dispute
is justiciable depends on the attitude of the parties; it is justiciable
if both parties want to have it decided on the basis of law. However, as Sir John Fischer Williams cautioned years ago, "the more
serious disputes, those which involve the more fundamental issues,
are those where a change in the law is sought."29 Brierly suggests
that,
"The analogy of the compulsory jurisdiction of municipal
courts is in many ways deceptive. For one thing, they are
part of an elaborate social organization which provides for the
enforcement of legal rights as such, and there is no near prospect of that in the international field. . . . In the last resort
there is no escape from the fact that judicial process, national
or international, can settle a dispute in the sense of finally
disposing of it only on one of two conditions; either the parties must be willing, or they must be compellable, to accept
their rights according to law in full settlement of their demands. "30
International law may give a solution to any controversy, but a
solution which leaves the unsatisfied party with merely a declaration that it has no legal rights to a change in the situation may
prove no satisfactory solution. Even within the state, there is con27 Message for "Law Day U.S.A." April 30, 1958, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 831 (1958).
28 A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF LAW AMONG
NATIONS: DIGEST OF PROCEEDINGS OF REGIONAL CONFERENCES OF LAWYERS 32 (1959).
20 WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE 5 (1932).
30 BRIERLY, THE Oun.ooK FOR INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 120, 122-23 (1944).
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stant need for legislation, for keeping the law up to date with social
changes; but in the international sphere we have no such legislative
process except as all the parties concerned may be willing to join
in a treaty to bring about the change.
We must further distinguish the types of controversy suitable
for settlement by a court from those calling for political adjustment.
The question of the right of passage through the Suez Canal, or of
the right to divert and use part of the flow of an international
river, is a legal question susceptible of judicial settlement if the
parties are willing. But the appropriate way in which to divide
the waters of the Indus between India and Pakistan so as to bring
about the fairest and most beneficial use of these waters for the
good of both countries calls for a basis of decision other than the
existing law. The question whether, by cutting off access to Berlin,
the Soviet Union (or East Germany) would violate international
obligations, is a justiciable question; the question what should be
done about the future of Germany is a political question falling
outside the special competence of courts.
In sum, how far is our present system inadequate to give us a
true international Rule of Law? I should be among the last to
disregard the highly useful services now rendered by international
law (and by international courts and international organizations);
but I must mention some of its obvious weaknesses. One can readily point to the lack of obligation to use the law and means for
settlement of disputes by application of the law, to the lack of the
organized type of sanction we find in modern domestic law and
which we need internationally if settlement by law is to replace
settlement by use or threat of force, to the uncertainty of many
international law rules (particularly on the customary side), the
smallness of its range in so far as it allows nations complete discretionary control over many matters which actually affect the interests of other nations, the slowness of its development, and the great
difficulties in bringing about by lawful means changes in the legal
.situation to meet an ever-faster-changing world.
Basically, our difficulty is that the peoples and governments of
the world are not ready for the surrender of sovereignty to any type
of world government, even on a most limited basis or on a federal
model. Professor Jessup thoughtfully remarked a decade ago,
"Until the world achieves some form of international govern·ment in which a collective will takes precedence over the individual will of the sovereign state, the ultimate function of law, which
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is the elimination of force for the solution of human conflicts, will
not be fulfilled." 31
But even if we doubt that a complete realization of the international Rule of Law is probable without extensive alteration in the
world's political structure,32 let us look at some current developments relevant to our subject in the world as it is.
First, we must take note of the sudden expansion of the international community as new nations achieve independence and conduct their own foreign relations. Particularly in Asia and Africa,
nations are becoming independent at such a rate that it is hard to
keep up with them! International law began as a legal system
among European nations with common ideas and ideals and fairly
similar domestic laws. The American republics, commencing with
the United States, were in the same tradition. Turkey was "admitted to the family of nations" in 1856; and Japan, China and others
gradually followed. But since the end of World War II, think of
the ever-lengthening list of new states taking their places in international affairs and international organizations: Philippines, Korea, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Lebanon, Syria,33 Jordan,
Israel, Indonesia, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea,
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Malaya, Cameroun, Togo, Mali Federation, and more to come like Congo, Somalia, Nigeria, Malagasy,
Sierra Leone, Cyprus, and others. While the world is glad to see
these countries achieve self-determination and independent control of their own affairs, these nations are by no means always happy
to accept all the customary rules laid down by older members of
the international community before they had acquired independent statehood. Some, at least, among these newer nations lack any
widespread acceptance of those values and ideas which pervaded
the international community when our system of international law
grew up. Other nations, like the Soviet Union and Communist
China, have broken with the Western past, and although still accepting international law on a pragmatic basis, no longer reinforce
that law by the values and ideals which aided its development.
These events have placed a great strain upon international law
and its instrumentalities. The "official doctrine" of the international community still follows what Daniel Webster wrote in 1842
as Secretary of State:
2 (1948).
& SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAw (1958). Of
course many other plans for altered international political institutions have been suggested.
ss Now combined with Egypt in the United Arab Republic.
81 JESSUP,
82
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"Every nation, on being received, at her own request, into
the circle of civilized governments, must understand that she
not only attains rights of sovereignty and the dignity of national character, but that she binds herself also to the strict and
faithful observance of all those principles, laws, and usages
which have obtained currency among civilized states.... No
community can be allowed the benefit of national character
in modern times without submitting to all the duties which
that character imposes."34
But anti-colonial memories, and short-range interests during the
"cold war," weaken the effectiveness in relations with these new
nations of many parts of international law other than those embodied in treaties specifically accepted by them. Here is a real
danger of a trend away from the international Rule of Law.
To balance this, we may note the growth of international
organization in the past decades. Alongside the establishment of
the League of Nations and then more recently the United Nations,
we see also the development of old and new specialized functional
agencies dealing with everyday international problems of health,
labor, agriculture, education, money, mails, aviation, telecommunications, meteorology, shipping, atomic energy, and the like.3 " We
have important regional or defense organizations like the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We must not lose sight of the effective work of bilateral
international organizations like the International Joint Commission which deals with boundary waters between the United States
and Canada, or the International Boundary and Water Commission
between the United States and Mexico, which has built and operates international dams. Of course we cannot forget the "supranational" European economic organizations, whose agencies and
rules operate directly upon individuals and corporations as well as
upon member states.
This growth of international organizations brings legal problems concerning their status internationally and before national
authorities, their relations with each other, the legal position of
34 Secretary Webster to the American Minister to Mexico, April 15, 1842, quoted in l
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1906).
35 For the constitutional documents of international organizations, see PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS (1956). For current
developments, use the quarterly, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. Concerning the work of
international organizations, see BECKEL, WORKSHOPS FOR THE WORLD (1954); LEONARD,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1951); HILL, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1952); CLAUDE,
SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES (1956).

1961]

THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW

567

international organization employees, and above all the interpretation and application of the treaties under which they are set up
and function. The "constitutional law" of each such organization
grows rapidly, while with what may be called "parliamentary diplomacy"36 their rules of procedure become increasingly important. Their assemblies and councils afford yet further fora for the
discussion and adjustment of international problems, with more
or less use of international law in the process. Their deliberations
frequently result in treaties to regulate and promote the activities
with which they are concerned. Such organizations provide much
of the administrative machinery we associate with governmental
handling of problems, and law is important in their daily functioning. They make a valuable contribution toward the international
Rule of Law, particularly when technical questions outweigh political considerations.
In international law today, the most noticeable phenomenon
is the amazing number, variety and complexity of international
agreements, or treaties, which represent purposeful development
of the law and which so largely replace custom in most fields by
more clearly defined rules chosen by the parties to meet their needs.
Treaties deal with an almost infinite variety of subject-matter: the
UN Charter, mutual defense, commerce, consular functions, taxation, standardization of vaccines and health measures, rights of airlines of one country to do business with another, etc., etc. Most of
the cases heard by the "World Court," and most of the international legal problems which today arise in legal practice or between
foreign offices, involve international agreements.
As the law contained in treaties has become the predominant
part of our field, the principles and practices pertaining to the
making, effect, application, interpretation, modification and termination of treaties become an ever more vital part of international
customary law. More and more we depend on the notion of pacta
sunt seroanda; our gain in clarity of international rules and their
suitability to human needs may come at the expense of that habitual conformity to law and tradition which characterizes all customary law. This growth of the written international law, comparable
to the great growth of legislation in the internal law of most countries and at the same time reminiscent of the change "from status
to contract" sometimes found by some observers in the history of
private law, renders more and more acute the problem of the bind86 See Jessup,
RECUEIL DES CoURS

Parliamentary Diplomacy, Hague Academy of International Law, 89
181 (1956).
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ing force of treaties, and of the possibilities of their lawful modification or termination.
We have developed "mechanics" of making international agreements which serve our ends quite well [whether we think of agreements approved by the Senate which we call "treaties" for constitutional purposes, or those entered into by the Executive alone
or by the Executive in conjunction with both Houses of Congress,
which we call "executive" or "executive-congressional" agreements]. Whether negotiated and concluded between two nations
by diplomats in traditional formal style, or handled informally as
exchanges of notes, or drafted at international conferences as compromises resulting from a series of majority votes, we have adequate means for expressing those rules and principles upon which
nations can agree. In these agreements, however arrived at, we
need careful and imaginative draftsmanship to avoid difficulties of
interpretation, and we need provisions ensuring that such disputes
as may arise concerning the agreement will be submitted to courts
or arbitration for settlement according to law.
The normal requirement of unanimous consent among the
parties to each international agreement may be slowly disappearing; by consent in advance nations may agree to be bound by lateradopted rules to which they do not give specific formal assent.
Thus the Halibut Conventions37 between the United States and
Canada provide that fishing regulations adopted each year by a
commission under the treaty shall be effective on approval by the
President and the Governor-General, without need to go through
the treaty-making process each time. In the technical annexes to
the 1944 Chicago Civil Aviation Convention,38 amendments become effective for all parties when adopted by two-thirds vote of
the Council, unless within three months a majority of the parties
to the treaty register their disapproval. Under the UN Charter,
amendments may be adopted by two-thirds of the membership and
obligate even those who oppose them, provided all five permanent
members of the Security Council concur in the amendment.39
Even with all that is being done to improve the internationalagreement process, we must remember how far it falls short of true
"legislation." We do not have rules laid down by any higher body
which nations must follow, but a process which at some stage re37 Convention signed May 9, 1930, 47 Stat. 1872; Convention signed Jan. 29, 19~7, 50
Stat. 1351; Convention signed March 2, 1953, 5 U.S. TREATIES 5, or T.I.A.S. No. 2900.
38 61 Stat. 1180.
39 U.N. Charter, art. 108, 59 Stat. 1053 (1945).
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quires the agreement of each nation to be affected. We have made
only the slightest moves away from the requirement of unanimous
agreement. The fundamental basis remains, that no state is bound
without its consent. As Marshall wrote so long ago in The Antelope, [23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825)]: "No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality
of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from
this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another."
One reason for technical international legal progress in matters
relating to the making of agreements is that no nation is obligated
to enter into a treaty unless it wants to. But where the law does
come into conflict with strong state policy, difficulties arise. When
one nation wants to escape the obligations of a treaty it has accepted, or to stop performing, but another party to the treaty wants to
keep it in force and demands performance, there is trouble. Here
we may find disregard of treaties admittedly in force, unless the
reasons for performance outweigh those for breach. This situation
brings up questions whether there is a right to terminate a treaty
unilaterally because of violation by the other party, and as to the
effect of changed circumstances upon the continuing validity of a
treaty when the parties did not provide for this contingency. The
customary international law on these questions is not clear. The
problem becomes how far those responsible for determining state
policies will judge that the general interest in maintaining the
sanctity of treaties is superior to the immediate gain they may see
in repudiating a burdensome treaty obligation. In this area the
best hope for progress toward an international rule of law would
seem to lie in making effective provision for the determination of
these cases, involving alleged rights to terminate for violation or
change of circumstances, by impartial international judicial or
political bodies.40
Another significant development is the breakdmvn of boundaries between international law and national laws as they are applied
in practice. Whether in private practice or as government official,
the fawyer usually meets international law questions intermixed
with the domestic law of one or more countries. More and more
frequently legal questions also arise in specialties such as international air law, international taxation, international telecommunications, international copyright, international narcotics control,
40 Cf. Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties, 29 AM.
Supp. 653, 1077-1126 (1935).
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health controls, conservation, and the like, where the specialized
subject-matter becomes a unifying theme for international law and
national law dealing with a common problem. Lawyers and government officials tend to think of aviation, taxation, radio, copyright,
or narcotics, rather than to distinguish between the national and
international sources of the rules involved. More and more of
international law today affects the individual directly. In many
areas we may see a difference between the growth and effectiveness
of the law applied in joint regulation of individuals by governments, and the slower and more doubtful development of rules
designed to restrain state action. What may be called "treaty-laws"
come to play a more important part alongside the older "treatycontracts." I would suggest that in this whole area in which nations
cooperate to regulate or promote individual activities, international law is most likely to afford a successful means of dealing with
the questions which arise, since political feelings are not so high
and both states concerned feel an obvious common interest in promoting (or repressing) the activity involved. In this limited field
the international Rule of Law is fast growing.
On the other hand, in the last decade or so we see considerable
de-emphasis of international adjudication, at least as compared
with the inter-war period or with earlier hopes. There is less resort
to the "World Court" or to international arbitration, and fewer
states are willing to undertake the obligations of compulsory jurisdiction. There appears to be a growing preference for non-judicial
settlement of international disputes; settlement by direct negotiation41 or international organizations are favored. One may see
here a certain analogy to the domestic efforts of lawyers to keep
their clients out of court. We must further remember that the
exalted and trusted position of courts internally in Europe and the
Americas is not shared by courts in all other parts of the world
such as the Soviet Union or many Asiatic lands. Whether we like
it or not (and as an American lawyer I don't like it!), the emphasis
is shifting away from the settlement of international disputes by
the judicial application of international law, and toward the specific agreement of the parties negotiated within the general framework of the law and expressed as a treaty. This trend from international adjudication toward negotiated settlement raises serious
problems for the international rule of law. Political and military
41 Sometimes followed by apportionment by a domestic claims commission of the sum
paid between various claimants.

1961]

THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW

571

power undoubtedly play a greater part in such negotiated settlements than in judicial decisions. On the other hand, many disputes
are not so easily susceptible of judicial decision, and call for political adjustment. The international legal order must include processes of political adjustment as well as judicial settlement. Formulation of, and agreement upon, generally applicable rules of international law may be less practicable and less useful than the
achievement of orderly solutions to particular problems in view
of their peculiar facts. 42 When we contrast the relatively small
number of independent states in the world and the enormous factual differences between these states, with the thousands and millions of individuals who live in even a small modern state, we
readily see why solution by general uniform rules may be less suitable in controversies between states than within the state. But if
the international Rule of Law is to have room for such means of
dealing with problems, as it must, safeguards must be worked out
to ensure that the solutions do conform to the Rule of Law and do
not depend solely upon arbitrary use or threat of power. Thirdparty settlement may not be quite essential to the Rule of Law
internationally, but attempts to dispense with it may negate the
Rule of Law altogether.
Finally, overshadowing these developments which may be of
interest chiefly to international law specialists is one overwhelming
fact: the disappearance of any safe or practicable alternative to the
use of law, in an age when nations have such ability to destroy each
other. We need only call attention to the all too obvious implications of a world where several powers are armed with atomic and
hydrogen bombs, missiles, instrumentalities for chemical and biological warfare, and so on, to see that the old alternative of the
actual resort to force for the settlement of international disputes
(instead of mere threat of force or fear that it might be used) has
lost much of its appeal even for those nations which might not care
much for the law!
With the world as it is, and in the light of these current developments, what may be done in a practical way to bring about a greater
approach to the international Rule of Law? Under-Secretary of
State Herter wisely said:
-!2 See Brierly, The Rule of Law in International Society, 7 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR
INTERNATIONAL RET, ACTA SCANDINAVICA JURIS CENTIUM 3, 9 ff. (1936), reprinted in BRIERLY,
THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND OTHER. PAPERS 250 (1958). See also
DICKINSON, LAW AND PEACE, ch. 1 (1951).
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"[T]he further development of the rule of law among nations must come through a slow evolutionary process. It will depend in the first instance on the growth of mutual comprehension among all nations of the need for the peaceful machinery
of law and of the horrors of the alternative machinery of war.
Thereafter it will depend on the spread of confidence born of
experience slowly accumulated in practical application of the
machinery and technique of law." 43
First, I would suggest that our own country, and other nations,
make greater use than we have made of the legal machinery we now
have. In cooperation with other nations, we could make far more
use of the International Court of Justice for the decision of legal
controversies (or for advisory opinions on legal questions before
international organizations) than we have in the past. We should
work for greater acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court, taking the lead instead of "dragging our heels"
through the effect and influence of the self-judging limitation on
our acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction found in the Connally
Amendment. 44 Here the Executive and leading members of Congress have strongly urged that we give up the right to determine
which questions are domestic as opposed to which are international,
and follow the Statute of the International Court in letting the court
decide according to international law whether it does or does not
have jurisdiction. President Eisenhower well said at Delhi University last December, "It is better to lose a point now and then in an
international tribunal and gain a world in which everyone lives at
43 37 DEP'T STATE
44 Note 18 supra.

BULL. 223, 228 (1957).
Concerning efforts to repeal the Connally Amendment, see Hearings
on Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court of Justice, Jan. 27 and Feb. 17, 1960,
before U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. Res. 94.
Urging elimination of this limitation on U.S. acceptance, see President Eisenhower, State
of the Union Message, Jan. 7, 1960, 42 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 111, 117-18 (1960); and correspondence between President Eisenhower and Senator Humphrey, id. at 128.
Urging repeal of this "self-judging" Connally Amendment, see further Preuss, The
International Court of Justice, the Senate and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 40 AM.
J. INT'L L. 720 (1946); Briggs, The United States and the International Court of Justice:
A Re-examination," 53 id. 301 (1959); A.B.A. Section of International and Comparative
Law, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING ASPECT OF THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
REsERVATION TO rrs ADHERENCE TO THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JumCE
(1959), reprinted in Hearings, supra at 281.
In 1947 the American Bar Association took action urging withdrawal of this "selfjudging" American limitation. 72 A.B.A. REP. 82, 378 (1947). In September 1960, it
refused to change from this stand.
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peace under the rule of law."45 Where we can, we should insist
on the inclusion in treaties of provisions to the effect that controversies over their interpretation or application should be submitted
to the International Court of Justice.
Secondly, if there is a real disposition to use international legal
processes, nations like our own might well consider the establishment of permanent local international tribunals to deal with the
thousands of international claims for injuries to individuals at the
hands of foreign governments, now gathering dust in the files of
foreign offices until the day when arbitral tribunals are set up. Individuals might well be given direct access to such tribunals in
their mm name, with as inexpensive a procedure as practicable.46
Possibly chambers of the International Court of Justice, meeting
in various parts of the world, could be used for this purpose.
Third, there is much room for useful work in bringing about
international cooperative compilation of international customary
law, and making the law easier to find47 as well as more clearly
defined,48 through codification work of the UN International Law
Commission49 and more widespread publication of sources.
45 Address at Delhi University, Dec. 11, 1959. Quoted in A.B.A. Special Committee on
,vorld Peace Through Law, COMPILATION OF QuoTATIONS 4 Gan. 1960).
46 See A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF LAw
AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 23-25 (1960). See also Borchard, The Access of
Individuals to International Courts, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1930); JESSUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 18, 32-34 (1948); BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CAsES AND MATERIALS 207-09
(1953).
-¼7 "The sources of international law are widely scattered. To get the law one must
gather together and distill evidence accumulated from centuries of custom, international
judicial and arbitral decisions, domestic decisions, writings of experts, publicists and diplomats, treaties, and many other sources. There is at the present time no adequate systematized
compilation of the above. If we are ever to have a world rule of law it is obvious that
there must be a current and complete set of source materials of international law which
would include reports, digests, indices and commentaries. We all realize how difficult it
would be to do an acceptable job of domestic research without such tools as the American
Digest System, National Reporter System, and American Law Reports Annotated. Previous efforts to create such practical tools in the international law field have met with only
partial success." A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, THE RULE OF
LAW AMONG NATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 30 (1960).
Steps in this direction have been made in the national digests of international law
prepared by Moore (1906) and Hackworth {1940-44) and published by the United States
Government; and in the excellent series founded by Lauterpacht as the Annual Digest of
Public International Law Cases and continued as International Law Reports, which cover
international and national court decisions since 1919.
48 The late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who served as the British member of the International Law Commission and later as judge of the International Court of Justice, wrote:
"[O]nce we approach at close quarters practically any branch of international law, we are
driven, amidst some feeling of incredulity, to the conclusion that although there is as a
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Fourth, we must strive for the better handling of non-justiciable
disputes by political means but in conformity with the law. In our
enthusiasm as lawyers for the use of the judicial process, we must
not forget the need for orderly change in legal rights through
negotiation assisted by political processes. As nations see the overwhelming need for peaceful settlement rather than reliance on the
threat or use of force, we may hope to see progress in dealing with
disputes where a change in the law is needed.
Finally, above all we must as lawyers try to bring about a better
public understanding5° of the need for international law, of what
we now have in the way of international law, of our existing means
for making that law and using that law, and a stronger conviction
that with the present powers of military destruction resort to law
instead of force becomes increasingly vital. If enough people in
enough countries want the international Rule of Law, we can go
a long way toward it even under present international political
institutions.
rule a consensus of opinion on broad principle-even this may be an overestimate in some
cases-there is no semblance of agreement in relation to specific rules and problems .•••
The fact, which is both disquieting and chastening, speaks for itself. There is, upon
reflection, nothing astonishing about it. How could it be otherwise in a society in which
judicial settlement is sporadic, in which there is no legislative activity in the accepted
sense and in which custom is slow of growth and controversial in interpretation and application?" Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 16, 17, 19
(1955).
49 On the work of the International Law Commission, established by the United
Nations to assist in the codification and progress development of international law, see
the YEARBOOKS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION. See also LAUI'ERPACHT, op. cit. supra
note 48; and Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law Commission, 57 CoLUM. L.
REv. 16 (1957).
150 Perhaps the best introduction to a better understanding of international law is
BRIERLY, LAw OF NATIONS (1st ed. 1928; 5th ed. 1955). See also BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL
LAw CASES AND MATERIALS (1953); and the quarterly AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.

